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Abstract
Background: Because both public health surveillance and action are crucial, the authors initiated
meetings at regional and national levels to assess and reform surveillance and action systems. These
meetings emphasized improved epidemic preparedness, epidemic response, and highlighted
standardized assessment and reform.
Methods:  To standardize assessments, the authors designed a conceptual framework for
surveillance and action that categorized the framework into eight core and four support activities,
measured with indicators.
Results: In application, country-level reformers measure both the presence and performance of
the six core activities comprising public health surveillance (detection, registration, reporting,
confirmation, analyses, and feedback) and acute (epidemic-type) and planned (management-type)
responses composing the two core activities of public health action. Four support activities –
communications, supervision, training, and resource provision – enable these eight core processes.
National, multiple systems can then be concurrently assessed at each level for effectiveness,
technical efficiency, and cost.
Conclusions: This approach permits a cost analysis, highlights areas amenable to integration, and
provides focused intervention. The final public health model becomes a district-focused, action-
oriented integration of core and support activities with enhanced effectiveness, technical efficiency,
and cost savings. This reform approach leads to sustained capacity development by an
empowerment strategy defined as facilitated, process-oriented action steps transforming staff and
the system.
Background
Because public health surveillance and action are crucial
to effective public health practice, the World Health Or-
ganization (WHO) has initiated consensus meetings at
the regional and national level to review and reform sur-
veillance and action systems [1–4]. These meetings em-
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phasized improved epidemic preparedness and epidemic
response. They also highlight the need to facilitate and
standardize surveillance and action assessments and to in-
clude integration strategies in the reform process.
In response, the WHO Regional Office for Africa (WHO/
AFRO) has recently initiated the Integrated Disease Sur-
veillance (IDS) project [5,6]. This effort uses the concep-
tual framework described in this report, which was
effectively pilot tested and used to develop a 5-year plan
of action (PoA) during the implementation of IDS in Tan-
zania ([7] and Nsubuga P, Eseko N, Wuhib T, Chungong
S, Ndayimrije N, and McNabb SJN; Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention, Tanzanian Ministry of Health,
and WHO; in press). WHO/AFRO have adapted, further pi-
loted, and subsequently adopted this framework for pub-
lic health surveillance assessments (Phase I of IDS) in
Africa.
The importance of surveillance and action reform is fun-
damental to reducing national and international threats
of infectious diseases [8]. Renewed threats to health posed
by emerging and re-emerging infectious diseases (IDs);
worldwide efforts to eradicate polio and eradicate dracun-
culialus and leishmaniasis; and the evolving drug-resist-
ance of strains of tuberculosis, malaria, cholera, and
Streptococcus pneumoniae have prompted an evaluation of
the performance of national-level systems of public health
surveillance and action [9–11]. In many countries, IDs
continue to be substantial causes of mortality, morbidity,
and rising health-care costs and must be carefully moni-
tored and controlled ([12–14] and Wuhib T, Chorba TL,
Davidiants V, MacKenzie M, and McNabb SJN; Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention and Armenian Ministry
of Health; unpublished manuscript). Any gaps, inaccura-
cies, or delays in surveillance and ineffective or inefficient
public health actions are revealed both by these renewed
ID threats and closer evaluations.
Many countries recognize internal problems with poor
performance – or lack – of public health surveillance and
action [1]. At the national level, the use of duplicative, in-
dependent, vertical public health surveillance systems
(e.g., one system for tuberculosis, another system for ma-
laria), while keeping surveillance close to action may re-
sult in the redundant use of personnel, excessive costs,
and ineffective or inefficient actions. Further, some high
priority diseases may receive less attention because both
technical and financial support for vertical surveillance
systems may come from outside a country's borders. De-
veloping countries' interests may not always be a top pri-
ority for duplicative, independent, vertical surveillance
systems. Such a situation results in the use of differing sur-
veillance terminology, methods – including analyses and
reporting procedures – and actions that overload health
workers. This may lead to discouragement and poor per-
formance.
To facilitate and standardize national-level assessments
and to create a user-friendly method of national-level re-
form, we designed a conceptual framework in which sur-
veillance and action reside as interdependent processes
(Figure 1). This intuitive framework is not only an easy-to-
use process of assessing surveillance and action, but also
can be used as a pattern for reform. The two processes
compose an open system, defined as the continual input
of new case-patients [15]. We categorized this framework
into eight core and four support activities that can be
measured easily by using well-defined, country-specific
indicators.
Methods
In the early years of modern public health (1940 – 1960),
the term surveillance was applied to the collection, analysis,
interpretation, and dissemination of (health outcome-specific)
data to those who need to know[16]. Later, public health sur-
veillance was defined as the ongoing systematic collection,
analysis, and interpretation of outcome-specific data for use in
the planning, implementation, and evaluation of public health
practice[17]. Rephrasing the latter meaning, surveillance
data are collected at the health facility – the first level of
contact of the patient with the health system – then ana-
lyzed, interpreted, and used for action.
Figure 1
Conceptual framework of public health surveillance and
action
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Surveillance, per se, does not include the public health ac-
tion(s) resulting from the interpretation of the data. Few
envisaged the inherent responsibility of surveillance prac-
titioners (i.e., those public health officials responsible for
interpreting the data collected) for prevention and control
actions. However, as early as 1963, the international pub-
lic health community through the WHO recognized the
importance of linking public health surveillance to public
health action [18].
In this conceptual framework, public health surveillance
comprises six core activities:
1. detection
2. registration
3. confirmation (both epidemiologic and laboratory)
4. reporting
5. analyses
6. feedback
Two core activities comprise public health action:
1. acute (epidemic-type) responses
2. planned (management-type) responses
All public health surveillance and action core activities are
enabled by the four support activities of
1. communication
2. training
3. supervision
4. resource-provision
Case-patient detection (core activity #1) is the first step of
this framework (Table 1). Defined as the public health cir-
cumstance or event that identifies a (presumptive) case-
patient as such by the public health system, case-patient
detection usually occurs at the health-facility level. Al-
though usually effected by a health-care provider (e.g., a
private physician, nurse, community public health work-
er, volunteer, or a paid MoH practitioner), the laboratory
may also play a role in detection (see also core activity #3
below).
Specified descriptive variables are then entered or regis-
tered into a public health record (core activity #2). Case-
patients may be detected but not be registered. Once reg-
istered, case-patients either remain unconfirmed or be-
come confirmed (core activity #3). Confirmation occurs
through the evaluation of epidemiologic criteria and/or
laboratory test results. Epidemiologic confirmation in-
volves intensive case-patient investigation in the field (e.g.
household or workplace). Laboratory tests help confirm
or rule out diagnoses of registered case-patients. By detect-
ing new, previously unreported case-patients through rou-
tine laboratory testing, the laboratory itself can serve as a
secondary or primary surveillance system by detecting,
registering, and reporting case-patients. Some laboratories
provide ongoing reporting of new health outcomes (e.g.,
antibiotic resistance).
Reporting (core activity #4) of case-patient data involves
the movement of public health surveillance data collected
from lower levels of the health system (e.g. health facili-
ties) to higher ones (e.g., district or national offices).
Once data have been received at the appropriate health
level, they are analyzed (core activity #5). Analyses should
be done as close to the primary reporting level as possible
so there is minimal delay in implementing the appropri-
ate interventions to prevent disease. Interventions to im-
prove data analyses might include training in analytic
methods, including data presentation (standardized
charts and graphs) and the establishment of indicator tar-
gets designed for public health action. Often, reported
data are numbers. Analyses of numbers produce results.
Results of analyses of surveillance data are the end points
of public health surveillance. However, for collected data
to lead to action, they must be interpreted or transformed
into public health information and then to public health
messages that are used for public health action.
Feedback (core activity #6) is the flow of information and
messages back to lower levels from higher ones. Targeted
interventions to correct poor feedback might include such
efforts as providing timely and regular messages from the
national level to the health-facility level on the basis of lo-
cally provided data. Even though public health surveil-
lance and action are interdependent processes (Figure 1),
they relate through inflow and outflow of data-informa-
tion-message (i.e., interpretation) (Table 2).
This transformation of data to information to messages
can been defined as a process, which is a series of actions or
operations, always in motion, directed toward a particular goal
[19]. The output of public health data-information-mes-
sages (interpretation) yielded from surveillance should
never be separated from public health action. Public
health action continuously influences public health sur-
veillance by providing public health interpretation toBMC Public Health 2002, 2 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/2/2
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guide any modifications in the content or scope of surveil-
lance.
Two core public health actions of acute (epidemic-type)
(core activity #7) and planned (management-type) (core
activity #8) responses rely upon messages derived from
surveillance. Acute (epidemic-type) responses occur di-
rectly, reactively, and generally include immediate public
health actions (e.g., epidemic investigation, contact fol-
low-up, or targeted interventions designed to stop the on-
going transmission of disease). Planned (management-
type) responses occur with periodicity over time and re-
quire a vision of future needs. Examples of such responses
include community public health education, purchasing
next year's immunization supplies, ordering tuberculosis
medication in anticipation of future needs, or reallocating
public health personnel and resources in response to
changing trends of disease. Public health actions, in turn,
must be measured, evaluated, and the results used to not
only measure and modify the control and prevention
measures taken, but also to guide future modifications in
public health surveillance.
Four support activities promote or improve the core activ-
ities by enhancing their performance through more effi-
cient and effective functioning (Table 1). Core activities
can and do occur with or without support activities. Gen-
erally, the more support, the better the performance.
Communication (support activity #1) usually proceeds
from public health authorities. By definition, communica-
tion is a process that involves at least two people in an effort to
convey, receive, interpret, and agree upon the meaning of data,
information, or messages[20]. Communication includes the
provision of public health messages through public
health bulletins within a country, or to other countries,
and also to supra-national organizations (e.g., WHO,
United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund,
or the World Bank).
Training (support activity #2) and supervision (support
activity #3) facilitates day-to-day operations. Interven-
tions might include motivating public health workers
through training and supervision and taking appropriate
public health actions in a timely manner. Other interven-
tions, such as training in decision-making, management,
and communications could tie the development of analyt-
ic skills and knowledge to applied broad public health
practice competencies. Resource-provision (support activ-
ity #4) – e.g., the availability of funds, trained personnel,
and materials such as communications infrastructure (i.e.,
telephone, fax, or computer), electricity, gasoline, or vac-
cine-promotes or improves all eight core activities.
The framework uses the concepts, goals, and objectives of
surveillance and action to provide the development of
flexible, yet objective, indicators, by each core and sup-
port activity and by health-care level, for any country (Ta-
ble 3). Indicators – used here as measures of performance
– can be customized to adapt to surveillance systems
throughout the world.
Results
The authors propose the application of this conceptual
framework of public health surveillance and action using
a five-phase approach to national-level reform. Using the
framework of eight core and four support activities as a
road map, public health practitioners can assess the exist-
Table 1: Idealized Distribution of Public Health Surveillance and Action Core and Support Activities in a Country with a District-Ori-
ented •1 Public Health Structure, by Organizational Level.
Organization 
Level
Surveillance Core Activities Action Core 
Activities
Support Activities
Detection Registration Confirmation
(Epidemiologic 
and Laboratory)
Reporting Analyses Feed-back Acute 
(Epidemic-
Type)
Response
Planned 
Management-
Type)
Response
Communication Training Supervision Resource-
Provision
Health X X X X X X X X X X
Facility
Health X X X X X X X
Facility Lab
District X X X X X X X X X
District Lab X X X X X X X X
Regional X X X X X X X X
Regional Lab X X X X X X
National X X X X X
National Lab X X X X X
•1 serving 250,000–500,000 personsBMC Public Health 2002, 2 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/2/2
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ing surveillance and action system, propose a model for a
future system, and develop and implement a plan of ac-
tion (PoA) to achieve the model through a series of proc-
ess-oriented action steps. These action steps yield not only
measurable outputs and outcomes (by virtue of objectives
with indicators), but also develop measurable sustained
capacity among MoH staff (by virtue of objectives with in-
dicators).
This five-phase approach begins with Phase 1 – prepara-
tion for the reform effort and ends with the full imple-
mentation of the reform model. Phase 5 involves the
evaluation and monitoring of the entire process toward
achieving the country-level, district-oriented reform mod-
el. Each process-oriented phase yields specific and meas-
urable outputs and outcomes, monitored by objectives
that guide the next steps.
Phase 1 – preparation
The overall design and implementation of all phases
should proceed under the direction of a MoH steering
committee (advisory board) that includes high-level deci-
sion makers and also representatives from the health facil-
ity and district level. The WHO Country Representative
can serve as a link between the MoH and other partners.
This steering committee should gain consensus and sup-
port from other MoH officials, donor organizations, non-
governmental organizations (NGOs), and other key play-
ers to explain findings, gain understanding and support
for the process and to build consensus on reform. The out-
come of this phase is a commitment to the entire reform
process. The steering committee will
• provide each organization with copies of reports;
• discuss major findings, interpretations, and conclusions;
• identify the specific interests and suggestions for im-
provement from stake holders;
• respond to questions; and
• invite participation in processes and debriefings.
Phase 2 – assessment of public health surveillance and ac-
tion
To assess the current status of surveillance and action, the
MoH uses indicators (Table 3) to measure the existing
presence and performance of the multiple, independent,
and vertical public health surveillance and action systems
using the eight core and four support activities. This as-
sessment involves a structured examination at all health
levels: national, regional, district, and health-facility. The
indicators are captured by questions (both in interview
and observation format) and framed into health-level spe-
cific questionnaires. The outputs from Phase 2 are objec-
tive findings that guide practitioners in the development
of a comprehensive PoA with targeted interventions con-
ceptualized, planned, and budgeted during Phase 3.
Phase 2 could proceed under the direction of a working
committee appointed by the steering committee. The
group would also include representation from outside
technical partners (e.g., WHO) and the national, regional,
district and health-facility levels. The Phase 2 working
committee will complete the initial analyses of the assess-
ment data and prepare a draft report of the findings to be
presented to the steering committee. A draft report is left
with the MOH and includes recommendations. Finaliza-
tion of the document is then done by the MoH.
Phase 3 – development of a Plan of Action (PoA)
Following completion of Phase 2, the MoH will review the
objective findings and develop a detailed PoA using cross-
cutting and surveillance themes. Cross-cutting themes
may include integration, district-level focus, budget, ac-
tion-oriented approach, and advocacy.
Phase 3 should proceed under the direction of another
working committee, appointed by the steering committee.
This working committee should involve staff from the
Phase 2 working committee and key stakeholders from
the various vertical programs involved.
The working committee of Phase 3 develops a first-draft
PoA based on the comprehensive review of the assessment
findings. The working committee is empowered to envi-
sion the final reform model, determine the major weak-
nesses that should be addressed to achieve it, and identify
the appropriate action steps. This workshop process is
conducted using the conceptual framework of the step-
wise surveillance core and support functions as a road
map, beginning with case-patient detection and working
through all eight core and four support activities, with the
reform model in full view.
The working committee then identifies the process-orient-
ed action steps to achieve each specific objective, includ-
ing implementation indicators, time-lines, the
Table 2: Example of Data-Information-Message
Data: There are 100 case-patients and five fatalities of measles in 
Region X in one month, with an incidence of 90/10,000 persons.
Information: This is a 50% increase in measles over last year at this 
time.
Message1: There is an epidemic of measles in Region X that requires 
immediate public health action. Every infant in Region X can be vacci-
nated for less money than it takes to treat the 100 case-patients and 
five fatalities.
1 Messages are subjective statements about information. They enable 
the target audience to put the information into the proper context 
for action.BMC Public Health 2002, 2 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/2/2
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organization or group primarily responsible for imple-
mentation, required resources, and means of overcoming
potential obstacles (Table 4).
Phase 4 – implementation
Phase 4 focuses on carrying out the process-oriented ac-
tion steps developed and described in the PoA as neces-
sary to achieve goals and objectives. Phase 4 is the most
critical and difficult phase, and often requires financial
support from outside agencies. Advocacy both within and
beyond the MoH is critical to final approval of the PoA.
Once formally approved by the MoH, in many countries,
advocacy to donors is critical. These activities are process-
es and include specific outcomes and indicators that
measure progressive change at all levels. They are conduct-
ed over the life of the project, beginning with the comple-
tion of Phase 3 in the first year.
Phase 5 – monitoring and evaluation
During Phase 5, there is a determination of whether the
planned changes are occurring by measuring progress.
Monitoring and evaluation provides guidance to not only
overall reform progress, but also helps identify problem
areas in implementation of the PoA. This phase is con-
ducted over the entire lifespan of the project, beginning
with the initiation of Phase 1 in the first year.
Discussion
The authors describe here a conceptual framework of the
interdependent processes of public health surveillance
and action. These two processes comprise eight core and
four support activities. The presence and performance of
these activities can be measured using well-defined indi-
cators that yield information. The information can then
guide a comprehensive national-level reform by identify-
ing gaps and opportunities for integration and by target-
ing interventions designed to improve the technical
efficiency and effectiveness of both public health surveil-
lance and action. These efforts will reduce costs.
Thacker and Klaucke et al. advanced public health surveil-
lance in 1988 with their strategy for surveillance assess-
ment [21,22]. Their strategy includes an evaluation of the
components of public health importance, objectives and
usefulness, operation of the system, cost, and system at-
tributes (simplicity, flexibility, acceptability, sensitivity,
predictive value positive, representativeness, and timeli-
ness). It involves both qualitative (e.g., simplicity) and
quantitative (e.g., predictive value positive) measure-
ments [23,24]. This evaluation strategy is primarily dis-
ease specific and may not be practical when applied to
national-level public health surveillance and action re-
form efforts that involve the evaluation and consequential
modification of entire country-level, multiple surveillance
systems.
The Thacker and Klaucke model is used most effectively
when a single health indicator (e.g., tuberculosis, hepatitis
A, or malaria) is being evaluated. It is less useful to evalu-
ate (concurrently) multiple surveillance systems or when
the surveillance systems being assessed monitor multiple
health indicators. For example, this model does not allow
Table 3: Sample Indicators Measuring the Performance of Public Health Surveillance and Action Core and Support Activities
Public Health Surveillance and Action Activity or Approach Sample Indicator
Detection Proportion of sites where the community has reported cases within past 
the past year
Registration Proportion of sites with a currently maintained registry
Confirmation (Epidemiologic and Laboratory) Proportion of sites with standardized case definitions for all reportable 
diseases (having implemented them)
Reporting Proportion of sites having submitted all four previously required reports
Analyses Proportion of sites with appropriate denominator data
Feedback Proportion that received any type of feedback from a higher level
Acute (Epidemic-Type) Response Proportion of sites involved in, conducting, or that conducted an epi-
demic investigation within the past six months
Planned (Management-Type) Response Proportion of sites that have implemented community-wide prevention 
and control measures based on local data within the past year
Communication Public health bulletin published and distributed quarterly
Training Training received in general epidemiology and public health surveillance
Supervision Surveillance activities were supervised during the previous six months
Resource-Provision Telephone service available
Empowerment Proportion of district-level MoH staff involved in Phase 2; MoH steering 
and working committees meet on a regular basisBMC Public Health 2002, 2 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/2/2
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sensitivity or predictive value positive to be calculated for
a surveillance system that captures multiple health indica-
tors simultaneously. It does not identify areas amenable
to integration.
The authors' goal has been to develop an evaluation tool
and provide a road map for national-level reform efforts.
The framework proposed here provides specific and objec-
tive data to measure the structure (i.e., a description of the
number and distribution of regional, district, and health
facilities), presence (i.e., system existing at the respective
health-care level), and performance (i.e., meeting the
minimum standards established by the MoH and required
by the indicator chosen at each health-care level) of mul-
tiple public health surveillance systems at a national level.
The framework is comprehensive, organized, consistent,
flexible, diagnostic, action-driven and oriented, and easy
for MoH staff to use. Further, it is designed to build sus-
tained capacity and can be used to economically evaluate
both the current and reformed efforts.
The framework also promotes a "public health action-led"
rather than "surveillance (data)-led" model that closely
meets the expressed needs of many MoHs [25]. It meets
the goal of public health surveillance; namely, to use pub-
lic health information to guide the system to take the ap-
propriate public health action [26]. The framework is
most useful in an applied context. Those countries in the
process of political and economic reform or those that do
not already have a well-established surveillance infrastruc-
ture may more easily use this approach than countries
with well-established surveillance systems. It is intuitive
for MoH field staff who might not have extensive training
in surveillance (Nsubuga P, Eseko N, Wuhib T, Chungong
S, Ndayimrije N, McNabb SJN; Centers for Disease Con-
trol and Prevention, Tanzanian Ministry of Health, and
WHO; in press), and it permits economic analyses of sur-
veillance and action (Carande-Kulis V, Aldrich M, Messio-
nier M, and McNabb SJN; Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention; unpublished manuscript).
A model of public health surveillance and action reform
must adapt to the ongoing political, economic, and social
realities of three concurrent movements: 1) decentraliza-
tion, 2) integration, and 3) primary health-care delivery
[27,28]. Funded in large part by international donors,
these movements drive the reform model of public health.
Decentralization of public health practice accompanies
the peripherally shifting movement of other governmen-
tal functions [27,28]. During decentralization, political
power, authority, responsibility, resources, communica-
tions and transportation capacity, person power, and au-
tonomy shift peripherally to a highly focused, more
efficient and autonomous district level (one serving
250,000 – 500,000 persons). Public health surveillance
systems have traditionally existed in a top-heavy and dis-
ease-specific (or vertical) form. With the governmental
shift toward decentralization, the integration of public
health-related activities, management responsibilities,
and services becomes critical to the efficient performance
of public health practice.
With the integration of health-care services, information
needs and uses and public health responses can change.
The movement toward the integration of surveillance and
action implies the ultimate focus of reform should move
from a program-specific focus (e.g., infectious diseases)
toward integration with other health problems (e.g., ma-
ternal and infant mortality). Accompanying decentraliza-
tion and integration is emphasis on developing a primary
health-care model by restructuring and combining essen-
tial health services, including public health services at the
district level. This model has the flexibility to include non-
infectious disease health outcomes.
Table 4: Example of Taking One Finding from Phase 2 and Developing a Detailed Plan of Action
Finding Recommendations Objectives Indicators Action Steps
Only 3/21 reportable dis-
eases have standard case 
definitions (SCDs) *
All reportable diseases 
should have SCDs for sus-
pected, probable, and con-
firmed case-patients. The 
Ministry of Health (MoH) 
should select or develop 
case definitions appropri-
ate for various types of 
health facilities/providers*
SCDs are established for 
every reportable health 
condition
SCDs are developed for 
each reportable health 
condition
1) The MoH should estab-
lish a working group
 2) Review existing SCDs
 3) Select/develop a pro-
posed SCD for each 
reportable disease*
 4) Conduct consensus 
workshops at district and 
national levels
* This information can be developed in much greater detail, e.g. tiered case definitions (e.g. suspect, probable, and confirmed) can be developed for 
different diseases and laboratory capabilities can be specified for various levels.BMC Public Health 2002, 2 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/2/2
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What then does the public health reform model envision,
and how should it be achieved? Directed through process-
oriented action steps, the conceptual framework of public
health core and support activities described here provides
the underpinning for the practical outworking of reform.
Its application envisages the creation, over time, of an in-
tegrated, district-focused, and action-oriented system of
public health practice, including both reformed public
health surveillance and action with enhanced effective-
ness, technical efficiency, and cost savings. This vision
should be achieved by an empowerment approach that
leads to sustained capacity development.
If sustained capacity development is desired, empower-
ment should be the central underlying strategy of public
health practice reform. Defined as a series of facilitated
process-oriented actions leading to transformation (i.e.,
improvement in public health judgment and performance
and increased competency in various areas of public
health practice), empowerment builds sustained capacity.
Beginning from phase 1, the respective MoH staff should
lead each phase of reform. The active involvement and
central role of the respective MoH staff in each phase in-
creases the likelihood of ownership, acceptability, and rel-
evance to local conditions of the final model of reform
that is adapted.
The processes of public health surveillance reform, which
lead to sustained capacity development, are as important
as the final reformed model itself. This transformation
process is focused on people as well as systems. Indeed,
the sustained development of capacity is measured by
MoH practitioners who are empowered and trained to
• think independently;
• react appropriately to changing public health circum-
stances; and
• develop new public health strategies.
The application of reform may require additional donor
funding, often from external international sources. Tech-
nical and financial assistance can come from other exter-
nal facilitator-partners (e.g. WHO, United States Agency
for International Development, United Nations Founda-
tion, and the Centers for Disease Control and Preven-
tion), but their role should be limited to the provision of
tools, resources, critiques or other technical guidance. It
requires time to implement reform strategies in an objec-
tive-based PoA.
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